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(Dated: December 19, 2018)
One of the recent no-go theorems on Ψ-epistemic interpretations of quantum proves that there are
no ‘maximally epistemic’ interpretations of quantum theory. The proof utilises similar arrangements
to Clifton’s quantum contextuality proof and has parallels to Harrigan and Rudolph’s quantum
deficiency no-go theorem, itself based on the Kochen-Specker quantum contextuality proof. This
paper shows how the Kochen-Specker theorem can also be turned into a no ‘maximally epistemic’
theorem, but of a more limited kind.
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In [Mar12], a no-go theorem is proved, regarding
Ψ-epistemic interpretations of quantum theory[Spe07,
HS10, LJBR12]. The theorem states that there are no
‘maximally epistemic’ interpretations of quantum theory
and that in the limit of large Hilbert spaces no more
than half of the overlap between quantum states could
be accounted for by epistemic uncertainty. The proof
is shown to be robust against experimental noise. The
simplest form of the proof makes use of the same experi-
mental arrangement as Clifton’s proof[Cli93] of quantum
contextuality.
A very simple proof that there are no ‘maximally epis-
temic’ interpretations of quantum theory can also be
obtained from the Kochen-Specker theorem[KS67], in a
manner that parallels Harrigan and Rudolph’s ‘quantum
deficiency’ theorem[HR07]. This proof is presented here.
However, unlike the theorem of [Mar12], this proof does
not set any bound on how epistemic a theory could be-
come, and would not appear to be robust against finite
precision loopholes.
The proof uses the ontological models
framework[HS10]:
1. After a quantum state |ψ〉 is prepared the system
is actually in a physical state λ, called the ontic
state. λ occurs with probability µψ(λ).
µψ(λ) ≥ 0∫
µψ(λ)dλ = 1
2. A measurement procedure, M , has a number of
possible outcomes {Q}, and has a probability,
ξM (Q|λ), of obtaining a particular outcome Q,
given the ontic state λ. The preparation proce-
dure only influences the measurement outcomes in-
directly, through the possible physical states pre-
pared.:
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ξM (Q|λ) ≥ 0∑
Q ξM (Q|λ) = 1
3. An ontological model will reproduce the results of
quantum theory if, and only if:
∫
µψ(λ)ξM (Q|λ)dλ = |〈Q |ψ〉|
2
The set Λφ = {λ : µφ(λ) > 0} represents the set of all
possible ontic states which may occur when preparing the
quantum state |φ〉. By contrast, Λφ = {λ : ξM (φ|λ) > 0}
represents the set of all possible ontic states which may
reveal the measurement outcome |φ〉 〈φ | when measuring
M . While it is clearly the case that Λφ ⊆ Λφ, the essence
of Harrigan and Rudolph’s theorem is that, for any on-
tological model for quantum theory, there must exist ϕ
such that Λϕ ⊂ Λ
ϕ.
As
∫
µφ(λ)ξM (φ|λ)dλ = |〈φ |φ〉|
2
= 1
∀λ ∈ Λφ ξM (φ|λ) = 1
If 〈ψ |φ〉 = 0 then
∫
µψ(λ)ξM (φ|λ)dλ = |〈φ |ψ〉|
2
= 0
and
∀λ ∈ Λψ ξM (φ|λ) = 0
which implies1 Λψ ∩ Λφ = ∅ .
If |ψ〉 and |φ〉 are non-orthogonal, then:
∫
µψ(λ)ξM (φ|λ)dλ = |〈φ |ψ〉|
2 6= 0
This allows the possibility that Λψ ∩ Λφ is not empty.
A Ψ-epistemic theory is one in which there exist at
least two distinct non-orthogonal quantum states, |ψ〉
and |φ〉, for which Λψ ∩ Λφ 6= ∅.
1 Ignoring sets of measure zero.
2There is a bound on the measure of the epistemic over-
lap. As ∀λ ∈ Λφ ξM (φ|λ) = 1
∫
Λφ
µψ(λ)dλ =
∫
Λφ
µψ(λ)ξM (φ|λ)dλ
≤
∫
µψ(λ)ξM (φ|λ)dλ = |〈φ |ψ〉|
2
In a maximally Ψ-epistemic theory, for any two quan-
tum states: ∫
Λφ
µψ(λ)dλ = |〈φ |ψ〉|
2
It is not hard to see that this will require
∫
Λφ
µψ(λ)ξM (φ|λ)dλ =
∫
µψ(λ)ξM (φ|λ)dλ
and hence that Λφ = Λ
φ, showing the connection to the
quantum deficiency theorem.
Now take an arbitrary state |Ψ〉 and expand it in an
arbitrary basis {|αi〉}
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
〈Ψ |αi〉 |αi〉
For each overlap:
∫
Λαi
µΨ(λ) = |〈Ψ |αi〉|
2
so (as 〈αi |αj〉 = 0, then Λαi ∩ Λαj = ∅)
∫
∪iΛαi
µΨ(λ) =
∑
i
|〈Ψ |αi〉|
2
= 1
which implies ΛΨ ⊆ ∪iΛαi , up to a set of measure zero.
However all states in ∪iΛαi satisfy ξM (αj |λ) ∈ {0, 1}
for any M . As this must hold for arbitrary |Ψ〉 and arbi-
trary bases, in a maximally Ψ-epistemic theory all ontic
states are non-contextually value definite for all projec-
tors. This immediately contradicts the Kochen Specker
theorem, which proves there is no model of quantum the-
ory which is non-contextually value definite, in a Hilbert
space of dimension d ≥ 3.
Although this provides a proof that maximally Ψ-
epistemic theories are not possible, unlike[Mar12] it does
not establish an empirically testable bound on the ques-
tion: how close to maximally Ψ-epistemic can one get?
Further, the Kochen-Specker theorem allows a finite pre-
cision loophole[Mey99, Ken99, CK01, BK04, Her11], that
can be exploited to allow non-contextual theories to get
arbitrarily close to quantum statistics, so it seems un-
likely that this proof could be made robust against ex-
perimental error.
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